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An impartial and independent tribunal is the sine qua non of our
nation'spromise of equal justice under law. The rule of law is imperiled
if justice is not done and if it is not seen to be done.

As political pressures on the judiciary mount, most states should
consider more fundamental changes to their systems of judicial
selection. But until that day, improved recusal procedures are among
the most promising incremental reforms.1

*
Associate Professor, Hofstra School of Law. Professor Sample served as
counsel of record on certiorari and merits-stage amicus briefs in support of the
petitioners in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). Thanks to Seth
Andersen, Eric Berger, Charlie Geyh, Rick Hasen, Aziz Huq, Ronald Rotunda, and
Roy Schotland for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Hugh M.
Caperton and his colleagues, for whom impartial justice is not merely an abstract
concept but an epic and admirable struggle.
1.
Thomas R. Phillips, Retired Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Texas,
Foreword to JAMES SAMPLE, DAVID POZEN & MICHAEL YOUNG, BRENNAN CrR. FOR
JUST., FAIR COURTS:

SETING RECUSAL STANDARDS

3-4 (2008), available at http:/

brennancenter.org/content/resource/fair-courtssetting-recusalstandards/
"Download PDF of report" hyperlink).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article considers the significant state court reform developments
in the year following the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Caperton
v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,2 as well as ancillary federal developments,
including renewed congressional interest in judicial disqualification.
Picking up on the author's view that "paradoxically for a decision
overturning a state justice's non-recusal, the majority's approach [in
Caperton] is a model of cooperative federalism,"3 this Article focuses
primarily on the initial developments pertaining to money in the courts in
Wisconsin, Michigan, and West Virginia in the short period since the
decision itself in June of 2009.
This Article notes that while recusal practices have certainly been one
focal point of developments in the states, Caperton has also provided a
significant boost to judicial public financing. After considering tangible
developments in the three identified states, this Article briefly points to
more nascent judicial independence efforts in other states, in which
Caperton connections are less direct, but where the case is nonetheless
figuring prominently in rejuvenated efforts to modify judicial selection
practices. The Article asserts that, while not all of the post-Caperton

2.

3.

See Caperton, 129 S.Ct. 2252.

James Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60
L. REV. 293, 293 (2010). The term "cooperative federalism" is used in a
wide variety of contexts, including, most commonly, statutory regulatory schemes. See,
e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692, 1692, 1752 (2001) (describing
"the classic cooperative federalism architecture of a federal floor with state
supplementation"). In the context of Caperton, I assert that the majority heeded the
counsel of both Ted Olson, whose federalism credentials could scarcely be stronger,
and of the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ), which expressed its view that "the
Constitution may require the disqualification of a judge in a particular matter because
of extraordinarily out-of-line campaign support from a source that has a substantial
stake in the proceedings" via a remarkable amicus curiae brief. Brief for the
Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 4,
Caperton, 129 S.Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45973. Also in line with the CCJ's
guidance, the Court properly set "a floor without drawing unnecessary and sweeping
bright lines, and without answering questions not presented-i.e., the majority decided
the case in exactly the manner suggested by the state chief justices themselves."
Sample, supra, at 296. This Article focuses on the next stage of the cooperative
federalism sequence: the initial efforts in the state-some successful, some rebuffed,
and some inchoate-to go beyond the newly defined "constitutional minimum" in
protecting and promoting the interest in the appearance and actuality of fair and
impartial courts.
SYRACUSE
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developments have improved the judicial impartiality landscape, on
balance, the decision is already producing meaningful improvements in
protecting the courts from the influence of money.
II. CAPERTON AGAINST THE NATIONAL BACKDROP
The key to analyzing Caperton's prospective import is to distinguish
between the bare constitutional floor set by the Court when faced with a
that the Court rightly-and repeatedly--described as
set of facts
"extreme,' 4 and the Court's clear understanding that more stringent state
judicial conduct rules are "'[t]he principal safeguard against judicial
campaign abuses' that threaten to imperil 'public confidence in the fairness
and integrity of the nation's elected judges.' 5 On the constitutional level,
the Court emphasized several factors that inform an ultimately objective

inquiry:
We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias-based on
objective and reasonable perceptions-when a person with a personal
stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate
influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing
the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or
imminent. The inquiry centers on the contribution's relative size in
comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign,
the total amount spent in the election, and the6 apparent effect such
contribution had on the outcome of the election.

Much is rightly made of the Court's repeated emphasis on what it
called the "extraordinary situation where the Constitution requires
recusal. ' ' 7 Yet it is also worth noting that all nine justices signed opinions
that also repeatedly expressed, in Chief Justice John Roberts's words, that
"[sitates are, of course, free to adopt broader recusal rules than the
'8
Constitution requires."
The word "extreme" is used throughout the majority's opinion, even
4.
appearing four times on a single page. Roy A. Schotland, Caperton Capers: Comment
on Four of the Articles, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 337, 337 n.3 (2010) (citing Caperton, 129
S. Ct. at 2265, 2267).
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266 (quoting Brief for the Conference of Chief
5.
Justices as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 4, 11, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252
(No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45973).
Id. at 2263-64.
6.
Id. at 2265.
7.
Id. at 2268-69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 2267 (majority
8.
opinion) ("States may choose to 'adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due
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Noting the "vital state interest" in public confidence in the courts, the
Caperton majority went as far as to reflect on its 2002 statement in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White that "'[t]he power and the

prerogative of a court to perform [its] function rest, in the end, upon the
respect accorded to its judgments"'; that "'respect for judgments depends
in turn upon the issuing court's absolute probity"'; and that,
consequentially, "[i]t is for this reason that States may choose to 'adopt
recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires."' 9 So while the
holding as to the absolute floor for constitutionally mandated
disqualification is appropriately narrow, the full Court could scarcely be
more clear in reiterating that states have the broad authority-and perhaps
even the responsibility-to enact stringent, rule-based disqualification
procedures that obviate the need for federal due process analysis.
Applying that principle where the rubber meets the road, it should be
abundantly clear that the applicable rules in West Virginia proved
insufficient even in a case so clear as to ultimately involve the violation of a
constitutional right. Why? Simply put, because one single individual,
Justice Brent Benjamin, failed to comply with either the letter or the spirit
of West Virginia's Code of Judicial Conduct. To be clear, West Virginia's
Code of Judicial Conduct required Benjamin's recusal whenever his
impartiality "might reasonably be questioned."' 10 With minor textual
variance, this standard is nearly universally applicable in the states.1 Yet
process requires."' (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
9.
Id. at 2266-67 (quoting White, 536 U.S. at 793-94 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis added). The combination of Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
White and his majority opinion in Caperton yields an interesting dynamic in which
certain traditional ex ante campaign restrictions are constitutionally suspect based on
the First Amendment-which at that stage stands as a relative matter, alone-while
unfettered First Amendment spending by stakeholders who end up before the court ex
post requires a balancing between First Amendment and due process interests. For
three compelling-though not always entirely in accord-analyses of the impact of
White, see Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181 (2004); Rachel P. Caufield, The Changing
Tone of Judicial Election Campaigns as a Result of White, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE:
THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 34

(Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007); and Roy A. Schotland, Impacts of White, 55 DRAKE L.
REV. 625 (2007).
W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (1993).
10.
See SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that "the
11.
general standard has been incorporated into federal law and the judicial conduct codes
of forty-seven states ... and it offers the most expansive ground for disqualification
everywhere it appears").
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short of United States Supreme Court intervention, there was no rule or
procedural backstop to enforce the standard that Justice Benjamin ignored.
Given dramatic increases in judicial campaign spending, and given the
striking fact that West Virginia's pertinent recusal rules mirror the rules in
most of the thirty-nine states in which judges face election, the practicalindeed the definitional-insufficiency and even impotence of West
Virginia's rules should create a clarion call for courts with similar rules to
protect against the same fundamental flaw. Absent United States Supreme
Court review, the objective standard was a dead letter in the face of Justice
Benjamin's subjective insistence on imposing his will, even in
circumstances so extreme as to ultimately violate the Constitution (much
less the ethical rules).
On a collision course with the general disqualification standard is an
increasingly stunning volume of cash. Nationally, at the state supreme
court level, direct campaign fundraising more than doubled, from $85.4
million from 1989-1998 to $200.7 million from 1999-2008.12 The source of
that cash is often the litigants, lawyers, and litigation stakeholders
appearing before the judges they support-a reality that is the cause of
concern among broad swaths of the public, lawyers, businesses, and jurists
alike.13 Wallace Jefferson, the current Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme
Court, recently framed the concerns in rather blunt terms:
In a close race, the judge who solicits the most money from lawyers
and their clients has the upper hand. But then the day of reckoning
comes. When you appear before a court, you ask how much your
lawyer gave to the judge's campaign. If the opposing counsel gave
more, you are cynical. 14
There is little doubt that in terms of numbers, timing, stakes, and
other circumstances, the situation in West Virginia was exceptional. The
scenario, while an outlier, primarily because the source of funding was a
single individual, also illustrates important trends. Notably, while the
increases in campaign contributions noted above are substantial, those
JAMES SAMPLE, CHARLES HALL, JONATHAN BLITZER, ADAM SKAGGS &
LINDA CASEY, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, 2000-09: DECADE OF
CHANGE (forthcoming 2010).

12.

See Justice at Stake Campaign, Polls, http://www.justiceatstake.org/resour
13.
ces/polls.cfm (last visited Apr. 19, 2010) (collecting and summarizing both national and
state level polling data from a range of organizations).
14.
DALLAS

Wallace B. Jefferson, Op-Ed, Why Not Elect Judges on Merit, Not Whim?,
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dw

s/dn/opinion/viewpoints/stories/DN-jefferson_13edi.State.Editionl.2212195.html.
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figures do not include independent expenditures, akin to the $3 million
spent by Massey Coal Chief Executive Officer Don Blankenship in Justice
Benjamin's support. In the last decade, six- and seven-figure independent
expenditures have become the norm in judicial battleground statesfrequently dwarfing candidates' official campaign war chests, drowning out
official campaigns on the airwaves, and distorting the discourse-with little
incentive for accuracy and even less interest in the distinct role of the
courts.'" Accordingly, recusal rules-or trigger mechanisms in public
financing systems, for that matter-that address only direct contributions
and do not take into account substantial independent expenditures are not
only likely to be ineffective, but may actually incentivize special interests to
operate less and less accurately and transparently than they otherwise
would.

The centrality of the role played in judicial elections by large
independent expenditures will surely increase in light of the Supreme
Court's January, 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elections
Commission.16 In the words of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: "In
invalidating some of the existing checks on campaign spending, the
majority in Citizens United has signaled that the problem of campaign
contributions in judicial elections might get considerably worse and quite
soon. ' 17 Justice O'Connor added that "if both [unions and corporations]
unleash their campaign spending monies without restrictions, then I think

Even those opposed to campaign finance regulations in the legislative and
15.
executive contexts recognize that major expenditures can create uniquely pernicious
dynamics in a judicial campaign. Rick Hasen of Loyola Law School, who is one of the
country's foremost election law experts, recently wrote about a judicial elections
conference he attended in Seattle, and reflected that "[i]t was a somewhat surreal
experience to sit next to Kathleen [Sullivan] (usually an ardent opponent of campaign
regulations aside from disclosure) [and] to hear Kathleen call for consideration of a
ban for everyone on independent spending in judicial campaigns .... " Posting of Rick
Hasen to Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/014439.html (Sept. 15,
2009, 08:17).
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also Posting of Rick
16.
Hasen to Room for Debate Blog, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/
how-corporate-money-will-reshape-politics/#richard (Jan. 21, 2010, 15:00) (asserting
that "[e]ven if the court is willing to entertain a fiction about the role large,
independent corporate and union spending plays in the campaigns, those in the public
paying attention will not be fooled," and that expensive judicial elections will be "going
from bad to worse").
Adam Liptak, Former Justice O'Connor Sees Ill in Election Finance
17.
Ruling, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at A17, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/
27/us/politics/27judge.html.
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mutually-assured destruction is the most likely outcome."' 8 Justice
O'Connor's concern is hardly unfounded. One scholar has estimated that
in the 2000 judicial election cycle alone, noncandidate spending in just the
five states with the most heated elections that year (Ohio, Michigan,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Illinois) totaled at least $16 million. 19
While such problems are not unique to the post-Caperton era, the
decision has put them in the spotlight, and has indirectly spurred tangible
movement in an arena-court reform-often marked by more talk than
action. On balance, the early post-Caperton developments reveal a kind of
"two steps forward, one step back" dynamic. This dynamic, while a net
positive in which the steps forward are significant and not to be discounted,
nonetheless brings to mind the mid-twentieth century observation of New
Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice and noted court reformer Arthur
Vanderbilt, who stated: "Manifestly judicial reform is no sport for the
short-winded or for lawyers who are afraid of temporary defeat."2 0
In the vein of Justice Vanderbilt's observation, then, the early
developments in Wisconsin, Michigan, and West Virginia, and the statespecific political contexts in which they are grounded, can be seen to
exemplify not only the momentum created by the case, but also the
substantial hurdles that persist for even the most modest incremental court
reform measures.
A. Wisconsin
If post-Caperton court reform is viewed strictly in terms of judicial
disqualification rules, the immediate aftermath of the Court's decision can
best be described as mixed.2 1 While the case was broadly supported and
the decision was predominantly cheered by the legal and judicial

Id.
18.
See Roy A. Schotland, FinancingJudicial Elections, 2000: Change and
19.
Challenge, L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETRIOT C.L. 849, 863 (2001) (noting with respect to
those figures that "although we lack even rough data on noncandidate spending in
other states in 2000 or other years, there is no question that this activity is not merely

an increase but a change in kind").
OF JUDICIAL
STANDARDS
MINIMUM
VANDERBILT,
T.
ARTHUR
20.
ADMINISTRATION: A SURVEY OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE STANDARDS OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION FOR IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, at xix (1949).

21.

See Posting of Bert Brandenburg to ACS Blog, http://www.acslaw.org/nod

e/148 4 9 (Nov. 17, 2009, 12:31) (noting that the "[f]irst answers are coming from the
Midwest, where divided courts have recently taken Caperton in different directions").
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establishment, 2 at the state level or even the judge-specific level, the
landscape quickly becomes more complicated. Wisconsin is a state in
which significant action has occurred since Caperton on two fronts-recusal
and judicial public financing-and the developments on those fronts, at
least when viewed through a primitive, binary, "pro or con" fair-courts
lens, have gone in opposite directions. As one group recently noted,
"Wisconsin has been electing Supreme Court justices for more than 150
years, but in very recent years these elections have been turned into
23
auctions."
Wisconsin, which holds its high court elections "off-cycle," in April, in
22.
Caperton has been particularly well received by state jurists. See Posting
of Nathan Koppel to Wall St. J. L. Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2O09/06/O8/masseycoal-ruling-getting-thumbs-up-in-judicial-circles/ (June 8, 2009, 14:47 EST) (noting
Indiana Chief Justice Randall Shepard's view that "it was wise of the majority to focus
not just on the amount of a particular contribution.., but its size relative to the total
amount of contributions"); see also John Schwartz, Uncertainty in Law Circles over
New Rules for Judges, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at A20 (citing Alabama Chief Justice
Sue Bell Cobb's view that Caperton is a "'good thing' because it will push judges to be
more careful"); Posting of Tony Mauro to The Blog of Legal Times,
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/06/coping-with-caperton-a-conversation-with-to
m-phillips.html (June 10, 2009, 16:21) (quoting former Texas Chief Justice Tom
Phillips's view that "Caperton established a principle that is really important: There
are constitutional concerns with a judge sitting in judgment of a case where a party is a
significant donor"). Meanwhile, academics and media have largely echoed American
University Professor Amanda Frost's assessment of the opinion as "a victory for
common sense and fundamental fairness." Amanda Frost, Editorial, Only a Partial
Win, NAT'L L.J., June 15, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202
431401637&Only-a partial win&slreturn=l; see also, e.g., Editorial, Honest Justice,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/opinion/09tuel.html?_r=
1 (describing the "right to a fair hearing before an impartial judge" as "more secure"
following the decision); Eliza Newlin Carney, A Win for FairerCourts, NAT'L J., June
15, 2009, http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/rg_20090615_7680.php (noting that
Caperton's "likely outcome is that state supreme courts will establish and enforce
clearer recusal rules for judges who may face conflicts of interest, guidelines that are
long overdue"). Still, praise for Caperton has certainly not been universal. Although I
disagree with some of the characterizations and conclusions that he offers, Professor
Ronald Rotunda offers a particularly thoughtful and, for critics of the decision,
representative critique. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the
Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 247, 277 (2010)
(arguing, inter alia, that "the Supreme Court should be able to give judges a better test
than 'it all depends' in deciding whether the judge must recuse himself as a matter of
constitutional law").
Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, Wisconsin Democracy Campaign
23.
Statement on Passage of Impartial Justice Bill, http://www.wisdc.org/prll0609.php (last
visited Apr. 1, 2010).
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part to separate them from the din of the races at the top of the November
ticket, had high court contests in three consecutive election cycles from
2007 to 2009. In sharp contrast to the relatively modest elections that
marked most of the 150-year practice, "[w]ith the 2007 race between
Annette Ziegler and Linda Clifford, and the 2008 race between Justice
Louis Butler and challenger Michael Gableman, Wisconsin turned
overnight into one of the costliest, nastiest battleground states in the
nation. '2 4 In March of 2007, the website FactCheck.org put it this way:
"The April 3 face-off between county Judge Annette Ziegler and attorney
Linda Clifford for a seat on the state's highest court has spawned a
springtime blizzard of negative ads in the milk-fed Midwest. '2 The 2007
contest set a state record for its expense, 26 with Ziegler emerging as the
victor in part due to the strong support of Wisconsin Manufacturers &
Commerce (WMC), a business lobbying association which spent more than
$2 million in her support-a sum that exceeded the total of Ziegler's entire
official campaign.2 7 Then, after its involvement in the election, WMC
helped to finance the appeal, and ultimately filed a friend-of-the-court
brief, in a $350 million tax refund case. 28 The case was "long considered ...
29
a top priority" by WMC.

From a timing standpoint, the controversy over Justice Ziegler and
WMC was magnified by a different controversy involving Ziegler that went
straight to the question of her credibility in evaluating her own
disqualification. While a lower court judge, Ziegler faced ethics charges
because she did not disqualify herself when she ruled on eleven cases
involving a bank for which her husband served as a director.30 Ultimately,

24.
25.

SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 12.
Viveca Novak & Emi Kolawole, Warring Ads in Wisconsin Supreme

Court Race, FACTCHECK.ORG, Mar. 30, 2007, http://www.factcheck.org/judicial-campai
gns/warring-ads in wisconsin-supreme-courtrace.html.
Keegan Kyle, Ziegler, Clifford Spend Record Amount on Campaigns,
26.
BADGER HERALD (Madison), Mar. 27, 2007, at A6, available at http://badgerherald.co
m/news/2007/0327/ziegler-clifford-spe.php.
Patrick Marley & Stacy Forster, Ziegler, Big Lobby Think Alike,
27.
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 12, 2008, at A6, available at http://www.jsonline.com/ne
ws/statepolitics/29473254.html.
James Sample, Can $2 Million for a Judge Buy a $350 Million Tax
28.
Refund?, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 5, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-sampl
e/can-2-million-for-a-judge-b_75492.html.
Marley & Forster, supra note 27.
29.
Posting of Andy Szal to WisPolitics.com, http://blogs.wispolitics.com/legal/
30.
labels/AnnetteZiegler.html (May 29, 2008 10:19); see also Sample, supra note 28
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based on those conflicts, Ziegler became the first sitting supreme court
justice in Wisconsin history to be disciplined by that same court. 3 Given
the patent ethical breaches in cases with such clear-cut conflicts, query then
whether a system that allows Ziegler the ability to subjectively judge,
without review, whether, objectively, "reasonable, well-informed
persons... would reasonably question" her impartiality32 in a case

involving the "top priority"3 3 of a $2 million supporter, is the optimal
safeguard for fairness-or even much of a safeguard at all. The question is
more than theoretical: Just two months after being disciplined by the state
in the $350 million tax case
supreme court, Ziegler authored a 4-3 decision
34
in favor of the position advocated by WMC.
Wisconsin's 2008 contest became a national judicial election
flashpoint both for its cost and its content. First, in furtherance of the
trend described above, nearly ninety percent of the television
advertisements that aired in the state were paid for not by the candidates'
campaigns, but by competing interest groups. 35 Second, by any measure, it
was expensive. Due to a combination of outdated Wisconsin campaign
disclosure rules and other factors, spending estimates for the 2008 election
vary widely, ranging from about $6 million to defeated incumbent Justice
Louis Butler's estimate of $10 million.3 6 Regardless of the exact total-

("[S]tanding by while scenarios like Justice Ziegler's become the rule rather than the
exception is not a serious option. Not unless you actually want to 'tell your great
grandkids about what happened to the rule of law in America back in the day."').
See Szal, supra note 30; see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
31.
Ziegler, 750 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. 2008).
See Wis. S.C.R. ch. 60.04(4) (2005).
32.
Marley & Forster, supra note 27.
33.
See Wis. Dep't of Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 754 N.W.2d 95 (Wis. 2008);
34.
see also Marley & Forester, supra note 27.
Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Just., Wisconsin Supreme Court Election
35.
Raises New Questions About Judicial Election Reform (Apr. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/wisconsin-supreme-court-election-rai
sesnew-questions-about judicialelecti/.
See Craig Gilbert & Patrick Marley, Ruling on Judges' Campaign Cash
36.
May Echo in Wisconsin, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 13, 2009, http://www.jsonline.c
om/news/statepolitics/48009917.html (estimating cost at $6 million); see also Hon. Louis
Butler, Remarks at the Sandra Day O'Connor Conference on the State of the
Judiciary: State Judicial Races-How Can Corporations Help Stop the Campaign
Funding 'Arms Race'? (Oct. 2, 2008), availableat http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webc
ast/eventDetail.cfm?eventlD=625 ("We know that [the reported] number is grossly
underrepresented because none of it tracks the cable money and all of the cable
expenditures. Unless you have the resources and [unless you are] willing to go out to
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which, barring altruism by the spenders, will never be known-spending
was at or near the record levels of 2007, and most of the underwriting came
from a few big-spending interest groups, led by WMC.3 7 Third, the most
notorious, though electorally effective, aspect of the campaign was a
grossly misleading and racially divisive television campaign sponsored not
by a special interest group, but rather by Justice Butler's opponent,
Michael Gableman. The advertising campaign received national attention,
with some national analysts characterizing it as a "Willie Horton-style
hit."' 38 The advertisement so distorted and disparaged the constitutionally
protected role of criminal defense counsel that, as with Ziegler, upon
himself in the midst of an ethics
taking the bench, Gableman quickly found
39
own.
his
of
thicket
recusal
a
and
inquiry
Instead of following through on the United State Supreme Court's
mandate for states to enact recusal rules that protect the "vital state
interest" in promoting the "respect for judgments [that] depends.., upon
the issuing court's absolute probity, ' 40 a bitterly divided Wisconsin
Supreme Court, with WMC's prime beneficiaries Justices Ziegler and
Gableman in a 4-3 majority, adopted two petitions for amendments to the
state code of judicial conduct that go in exactly the opposite directionincluding one petition that, to bring matters full circle, was submitted four

the municipalities to track the cable spending one by one, you can't get at those
figures.").
See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 12.
37.
Viveca Novak, Wisconsin Judgment Day, the Sequel, FACrCHECK.ORG,
38.
Mar. 21, 2008, http://www.factcheck.org/elections-2008/wisconsin-judgment-day-the-s
equel.html.
In November 2009, a three-judge panel recommended that the ethics
39.
complaint asserting Gableman's advertisement was a lie be dismissed. Patrick Marley,
Judicial Panel Recommends Dismissal of Gableman Complaint, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/69866327.html.
The panel, however, while finding the advertisement merely misleading, stopped far
short of approving the advertisement. Id. One judge wrote separately to indicate his
view that "[miore troubling than the misleading implication (in the ad) is the
advertisement's disdain for the role of defense counsel in our adversary system." Id.;
see also Patrick Marley, Issue of Gableman Recusal Divides State Supreme Court,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 16, 2009, http://www.jsonline.comlnews/statepolitics/645
50007.html (noting that criminal defense attorneys have sought to have Gableman
removed from multiple criminal cases and that the matter has divided the high court).
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266-67 (2009)
40.
(quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
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months after Caperton by none other than WMC. 41 The majority also
voted to adopt another similar petition that was drafted by the Wisconsin
4
Realtors Association (WRA). 1

Pursuant to WMC's petition, no judge would be required to recuse
herself based solely on a litigant's "sponsorship of an independent
expenditure or issue advocacy communication.., or by a party to the
proceeding's donation to another organization that sponsors an
independent communication. ' 43 As the State Bar of Wisconsin noted in an
article previewing the hearing on the petitions, "[o]n its face, WMC's

proposed rule might apply no matter how large a litigant's financial
expenditure or donation." 44 Capturing this aspect of the rule, Bert
Brandenburg wrote, in an article for the American Constitution Society,
that "if Bernie Madoff had spent $100 million to elect a Wisconsin
Supreme Court justice, a victim suing him for redress couldn't point to the
support and ask the justice to abstain. ' 45 Squaring such a rule even with
Caperton's constitutional floor seems difficult, but squaring it with the
41.
Alex De Grand, In Battle over Judicial Recusal, First Amendment
Trumped Due ProcessRights, STATE BAR OF Wis., Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.wisbar.org/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=InsideTrack&Template=/CustomSource/InsideTrack/cont
entDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=87204; see also Petition for Supreme Court Rule, In the
Matter of Amending the Code of Judicial Conduct (No. 09-10), available at
http://wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0910petition.pdf.
42.
De Grand, supra note 41; see also Petition for Supreme Court Rule, In the
Matter of Amending the Rules of Judicial Conduct (No. 08-25), available at
http://wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0825petition.pdf (applying to the receipt of "lawful
campaign contribution[s]," a matter of significantly less concern given that states,
including Wisconsin, can and do cap contributions, whereas independent expenditures
are unlimited under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
43.
Petition for Supreme Court Rule, supra note 41. The Court rejected an
absurd petition by Wisconsin's League of Women Voters that would have required
recusal for contributions over a $1,000 threshold. See Adam Korbitz & Alex De
Grand, Court to Tackle Recusal Issue and Other Rules Petitions, STATE BAR OF WIS.,
Oct. 27, 2009, http://www.wisbar.org/am/template.cfm?section=LegislativeAdvocacy&
template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=87014. The Court likewise rejected a
more moderate proposal by former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice William Bablitch
that would require recusal if a party or an attorney gave the justice $10,000, the legal
limit for individual campaign donations, and would have also required recusal for thirdparty expenditures, though the threshold for those was less clear. Id. The Wisconsin
State Bar recommended the establishment of a study commission to look into the issue
in more depth. Id.
44.
Korbitz & De Grand, supra note 43.
45.
Posting of Bert Brandenburg to ACS Blog, http://www.acslaw.org/node/14
849 (Nov. 17, 2009, 12:31) (emphasis added).
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state's further mandate to protect and promote the "vital interest" in
probity is impossible.
Members of the court's majority, including Justice Patience
Roggensack, emphasized the First Amendment: "'I know we are being
asked to focus on recusal, not the right to vote,' Roggensack said. 'But I do
not think you can help but impact the First Amendment when you set the
kind of limits that require recusal."'' 46 After the rule was widely disparaged
in editorials across the state, Justice Roggensack, responding to what she
characterized as "some articles in the media, ' 47 took the unusual step of
writing an op-ed in the state's largest paper, the Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel, the editorial board of which had described the rule adopted by the
court as "[f]oolish. '' 48 In that op-ed, Justice Roggensack asserted that her
vote was "about protecting the state's voters" and that the "protection of
every voter's First Amendment right to have his or her vote counted...
was the driving force behind the decision of the court" because, while it
would have been "politically correct" to decide otherwise, "the oath of
judicial office that I took requires much more. It requires that I do my best
to uphold the First Amendment rights of all Wisconsin voters. '49 Similarly,
Justice Gableman expressed his view that "[i]f there is something
unacceptable about a political candidate, a candidate for any public office
including a judge or justice, the power in this country resides with the
people [to remove him or her]." 5 0
The overlap in the two approaches, as described by the justices, is
striking in many respects, but perhaps no aspect is more notable than this:
despite Caperton, neither justice sees any other constitutional interest
Justice
against which the First Amendment must be balanced.
Roggensack's self-described perception of her oath of office is narrow,
even to the point of dismissing circumstances that, just months earlier, the
United States Supreme Court described as involving "a serious risk of

46.

De Grand, supra note 41.

47.
Patience Drake Roggensack, Op-Ed, The Vote Was About Protecting
State's Voters, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec., 5, 2009, http://www.jsonline.com/news/o
pinion/78556262.html.
48.
Editorial, To the Highest Bidder?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 2009,
at 12A, available at http://www.jsonline.comlnews/opinion/69192522.html ("Last week
in a 4-3 vote, the court's conservative majority adopted a rule that essentially says no
amount of campaign backing constitutes a conflict even if that contributor has a case
before the court. Foolish. The Legislature must save the court from itself.").
Roggensack, supra note 47.
49.
De Grand, supra note 41 (first alteration in original).
50.

Soo
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actual bias-based on objective and reasonable perceptions." 51 For that
matter, it is apparently of little concern to Justice Gableman that the
chance to vote against an incumbent justice in a distant future election is of
scant consolation to a litigant deprived of a fair tribunal.
In a peculiar development, on December 7, 2009, Justice David
Prosser, the fourth member of the majority (with Justices Roggensack,
Ziegler, and Gableman), announced that he was withdrawing his October
vote in which he and the court had adopted "verbatim" the petitions by
WMC and WRA. 52 Prosser indicated that this was because of the need for
"fine tuning."53 As such, the new rule no longer commanded a majority of
the court, although there was little reason to believe that, beyond minor
drafting changes, Justice Prosser would ultimately support a materially
different provision. 54 Accordingly, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson
indicated that the court would revisit the matter in January of 2010.55
In a chilling and coincidental bit of foreshadowing, Wisconsin's high
court not only re-adopted the original proposal by the same 4-3 vote, but
did so on the very same day that the United States Supreme Court
announced its decision in Citizens United, which, among other things,
overturned century-old restrictions on corporations and unions spending
their general treasury funds to support candidates for election. 56 Taken in
combination, Wisconsin's disqualification rule and Citizens United form an
embossed invitation for corporate and union litigants to shower
unprecedented sums of cash on judicial campaigns. Such a scenario was
not lost on Justice John Paul Stevens, who, in his dissenting opinion in
Citizens United, wrote:

[T]he consequences of today's holding will not be limited to the
legislative or executive context. The majority of the States select their
51.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009).
52.
Alex De Grand, Wisconsin Supreme Court Withdraws Earlier Vote on
Recusal Rules, STATE BAR OF Wis., Dec. 7, 2009, http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.
cfm?Section=News&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=88385.
53.
Id.
54.
See
Posting
of
Patrick
Marley
to
All
Politics
Blog,
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/78723802.html (Dec. 7, 2009) (noting that Justice
Prosser "said he still supports the rule in principle, but thinks it could be clarified").
55.
See De Grand, supra note 52.
56.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Patrick Marley, Court
Adopts New Campaign Donation Rules, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 21, 2010, at B1,
available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/82319592.html.
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judges through popular elections. At a time when concerns about the
conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch, the Court
today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union general treasury
spending in these races. Perhaps "Caperton motions" will catch some
of the worst abuses. This will be small comfort to those States that,
after today, may no longer have the ability to place modest limits on
to be critical
corporate electioneering even if they believe such limits
57
systems.
judicial
their
of
integrity
the
to maintaining
The dissenters on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, including Chief
Justice Abrahamson, were so exercised by the court's October action that
one dissenter, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, took the step of reading her
Justice
dissent aloud during the court's December conference.58
Roggensack interjected, "Ann, do you really want to do this? ... Do you
really want to do this as a justice of this court?" 59 Justice Bradley
responded that she would not "be silenced" and read aloud the dissenting
opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Patrick
Crooks. 60 Justice Bradley indicated, inter alia, that, "'[i]n light of the
peculiar way that this change to our code of conduct was adopted, it is no
wonder that some perceive the court as allowing "powerful lobbying
groups in our state... to write a major new portion of the state judicial
ethics code."'. 61 During the January 22, 2010 session, in which the majority
once again adopted the WMC approach, Justice Bradley stated bluntly:
"I'm just dumbfounded." 62
Whether the rule adopted, withdrawn, and re-adopted in Wisconsin
directly contradicts Caperton, or whether it merely, in the words of Justice
Bradley, "'memorialize[s] the status quo into law,"' is not yet clear. 63 On
one hand, WMC and those who support the rule can claim that, at least as a
matter of pure formalism, their singular focus on the factor of expenditures
not necessitating recusal does not contradict Caperton, which focused on
expenditures in the context of multiple factors. As a practical matter,
though, the issue of expenditure-based recusal, coming up as it does in the
context of litigation, almost always involves additional factors. Those
57.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted).
Marley, supra note 54.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
61.
Id.
62.
Marley, supranote 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
De Grand, supra note 41.
63.
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factors include the nature of the spender's interest, the timing of the
expenditures vis-A-vis the litigation, the proportion of overall support for
the judge traceable to that particular benefactor, and, at least at the
extremes of six- to seven-figure support, it is the extent of the support itself
that makes the concerns sui generis.
While final formal action on the new rule did not occur until January,
the December tremors in Wisconsin amounted to the first significant postCaperton recusal development in the states, and that action unequivocally
favored the perspective that failed to carry the day in Caperton itself. From
the perspective of those concerned about money in the courts, Wisconsin's
new disqualification rule amounts to snatching defeat from the jaws of
victory.
After Wisconsin's high court initially passed the new rule, the
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel editorial page, in addition to calling the rule
"[f]oolish," framed the in-state political landscape this way: "The
Legislature must save the court from itself." 64 The reference was an
exhortation to the legislature to pass a long-sought, long-stalled public
financing bill for judicial campaigns in the state. 65 In December of 2009,
Wisconsin became the third state in the nation to enact public financing
laws for supreme court elections. 66 FactCheck.org summarizes the new
law's key provisions as follows:
Would-be justices would qualify for the funds by agreeing to limit
spending and by raising small sums totaling between $5,000 and
$15,000 from 1,000 different contributors. They could then receive up
to $100,000 for a primary race and up to $300,000 for a general
election-which, even in an inexpensive media market, won't fund too
many TV ads of any kind. However, if one candidate "opts out" of the
new system to raise unlimited funds, his or her opponent(s) could then
receive more money, and a "rescue provision" would give additional
funds to candidates who were being attacked by third parties. In no
case, though, could they receive more than $900,000 for a general
election. The law also limits individual contributions to candidates who
aren't participating in the system to $1,000, down from the current
$10,000 cap-a factor likely to encourage candidates to choose public
64.
65.
66.

Editorial, supra note 48.
Id.
Viveca Novak, Public Financing Comes to Wisconsin Supreme Court,

Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.factcheck.org/2009/12/public-financing-com
es-to-wisconsin-supreme-court/.
FACrCHECK.ORG,
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financing. 67

That such a bill passed despite the worst economic crisis in Wisconsin
in decades, and at a time of dramatic state spending cuts, 68 speaks to the
breadth of public concern growing out of Wisconsin's recent high court
campaigns. 69 Indeed, a 2008 poll indicated that not only did support for the
bill command a 65%-26% majority, but that Republicans (who would be
traditionally less likely to support campaign finance regulations) supported
it by a 58%-32% margin, and that "[e]ven a plurality of self-identified
'very conservative voters' supported the proposal" by a 48%-39%
margin. 70 The State Bar of Wisconsin released a statement calling the
Governor's signature on the bill "the finishing touches on the most
significant judicial election reform in several decades. ' 71 The Bar's
"several decades" sentiment was echoed by in-state reform groups which
stated that the system "easily qualifies as the most significant campaign
reform in Wisconsin in more than 30 years" and which hope that the
Id.; see also S.B. 40, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2009), available at
67.
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2009/data/SB-40.pdf.
See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Governor Jim Doyle, Governor
68.
Doyle Announces Cuts to State Budget (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.wisgov.s
tate.wi.us/journal mediadetail.asp?locid=19&prid=4224 (announcing a number of
significant Wisconsin state budget cuts in response to a deficit reaching $1.5 billion).
Perhaps somewhat ironically, the law now characterized as saving the
69.
court from itself received a major boost from that same court in December of 2007,
when Chief Justice Abrahamson organized a public letter, signed unanimously by the
court members at the time, endorsing the concept of public financing for judicial
elections, while stopping short of endorsing any particular bill:
We write to support the concept of realistic, meaningful public financing for
Supreme Court elections to facilitate and protect the judicial function.
A cornerstone of our state is that the judiciary is fair, neutral, impartial, and
non-partisan. The risk inherent in any non-publicly funded judicial election
for this Court is that the public may inaccurately perceive a justice as beholden
to individuals or groups that contribute to his or her campaign. Judges must
not only be fair, neutral, impartial and non-partisan but also should be so
perceived by the public.
Letter from The Supreme Court of Wisconsin to The Public (Dec. 10, 2007), available
at http://www.wicourts.gov/news/archives/2007/docs/campaignfinanceletter.pdf.
70.

JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN,

JAN.

2008 Wis.

SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS,

available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/AmViewWIPollFactSheet_76C00
15493CD4.pdf.
Adam Korbitz, State Bar Lauds Signing of Landmark Impartial Justice
71.
Bill, STATE BAR OF Wis., Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Secti

on=News&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=87964.
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system "marks the beginning of Wisconsin's return to the kind of high
court elections that served [Wisconsin] extremely well for over a century
and a half.

'7 2

That optimism must be balanced against a serious concern that the
one significant shortcoming in the Impartial Justice Bill will seriously
undermine its efficacy: namely, the system enacted by Wisconsin, unlike
the highly successful public financing system for judicial elections in North
Carolina73 upon which Wisconsin's new system is partly modeled, does not
take into account the advertisements run by groups like WMC, as opposed
to the candidates' own campaigns.
In other words, a candidate
participating in the system will not receive so-called "trigger" or "rescue"
funds based on advertisements that effectively support his or her opponent
(most often by attacking the disfavored candidate) if the ads are paid for by

independent groups-a category so significant that it has recently
amounted to the majority of the television advertising in the state's court
races.

74

72.
Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, supra note 23.
73.
For an excellent summary of North Carolina's system, which was recently
unanimously upheld by the Fourth Circuit against a constitutional challenge, see
DAMON CIRCOSTA, N.C. CR. FOR VOTER EDUC., PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA-A BRIEF HISTORY, availableat http://www.lwvwi.or
g/cms/images/stories/Damon%20Circosta%20handout.pdf. The Fourth Circuit held
that North Carolina's system furthered First Amendment interests and that the system
"embod[ied] North Carolina's effort to protect [the] vital interest in an independent
judiciary." N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake,
524 F.3d 427, 441 (4th Cir. 2008). By way of disclosure, in proceedings before the
district court, I represented defendant Common Cause North Carolina, who intervened
in support of the North Carolina system. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision granting defendants' motion to dismiss the challenge.
74.
See Korbitz, supra note 71 (noting that "supplemental grants cannot be
made to counter so-called 'issue ads' run by third parties during a campaign, which
target candidates without invoking specific calls to vote for or against a candidate"). In
one recent and illustrative example of the import of outside expenditures, in
Wisconsin's 2008 election, "special interest groups were responsible for nearly 90% of
all money spent on television ads in the state." SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 12.
Although the criminal justice advertisements run against Justice Butler were
particularly distasteful, one scholar has noted that as a general matter, "the tough on
crime message, or some derivation thereof, is among the most, if not the most,
prevalent in judicial campaigns." Keith Swisher, Pro-ProsecutionJudges: "Tough on
Crime," Soft on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification,52 ARIZ. L. REV. 327 (forthcoming
2010). See also Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns,35 IND. L.
REV. 669, 676-79, 687-89 (2002) (studying the 2000 state supreme court elections and
finding criminal justice to be the most frequent theme in campaign advertisements).
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For that reason, at least one prominent Wisconsin political scientist,
University of Wisconsin Professor Charles Franklin, stated that he will "be
surprised if this solves the problem." 5 Since Wisconsin does not have a
high court race in 2010, the first opportunity to test the system will come in
2011, when the aforementioned Justice Prosser, who opposed the bill, is up
for re-election.7 6 The system's failure to address independent expenditures
and to include triggered matching funds based on those expenditures,
particularly in a state where they have become a dominant electoral factor,
is the elephant in the room. But while imperfect, the law is a significant
step forward, particularly in a challenging economic time, and will likely
mitigate the perceived influence of money in the Wisconsin courts.
B. Michigan
As in Wisconsin, the contextual backdrop in Michigan involves
contentious and expensive high court campaigns over the last decade,
particularly in 2008, as well as a perceived shift in the court resulting from
those campaigns. Whereas the perception in Wisconsin (where candidates
are officially nonpartisan) is that candidates unofficially backed by
Republicans went from a minority on the court to a 4-3 majority with the
victories of Justices Ziegler and Gableman, in Michigan, the perception is
the opposite. As noted in the latest edition of the New Politics of Judicial
Elections, "[f]or much of the decade, four conservative Supreme Court
justices dominated Michigan's Supreme Court. Their opponents, who
assailed the justices as an anti-plaintiff 'Gang of Four,' helped sweep Chief
Justice Cliff Taylor out in 2008." 7 In the 2008 contest, Chief Justice Taylor
was unseated by challenger Diane Hathaway based in significant part on a
controversial, million-dollar advertising campaign underwritten by the
state Democratic Party, which, via a dramatization, portrayed Taylor as
sleeping on the bench. 78 Taylor was supported by advertising from79 the
Michigan Republican Party and the Michigan Chamber of Commerce.
75.

Public Funding Available for Supreme Court Races, Wis. L.J., Dec. 2,

2009, http://www.wislawjournal.co /narticle.cfm/2009/12/07/Public-funding-available-for
-Supreme-Court-races.
Patrick Marley & Lee Bergquist, Doyle Signs High Court Election Bill,
76.
MILWAUKEE J.

SENTINEL,

Dec. 1, 2009, at Al, availableat http://www.jsonline.com/new

s/statepolitics/78230432.html.
SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 12.
77.
Viveca Novak, The Case of the Sleeping Justice, FACrCHECK.ORG, Nov.
78.
26, 2008, http://www.factcheck.org/elections-2008/the-case-ofthe-sleeping.justice.ht
ml.
79.

Anonymous Donors Dominated Supreme Court Campaign, MICH.
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Assuming that one credits as the first major recusal development
post-Caperton the subsequently withdrawn (but only formally so) October
vote in Wisconsin to adopt a rule prohibiting recusal based solely on
unlimited expenditures, the second major development occurred just across
Lake Michigan. As in Wisconsin, the action caused bitter divisions on
Michigan's court, but unlike in Wisconsin, the new rules are unequivocally
voted
consistent with the spirit of Caperton.8° Michigan's Supreme Court
81
in November, 2009 to adopt new rules governing disqualification.
On the issue of recusal, in a very short time, and expressly in response
to Caperton, Michigan jumped from laggard to leader. First, Michigan is
no longer among the lone outliers in not having adopted the American Bar
Association's general disqualification standard requiring judges to recuse
themselves whenever their impartiality "might reasonably be
questioned. ' 82 Second, with the strong support of Michigan Chief Justice
Marilyn Kelly, the state adopted a new administrative rule whereby the
objective component of that standard would no longer be subject to the
fundamental flaw exposed in Caperton itself-the entirely subjective and
unreviewable determination of that objective standard by the target judge
83
herself.
Michigan's responsiveness to Caperton could scarcely be more direct,
with the new rules going so far as to include in their articulations of the
reasons warranting disqualification instances in which the "judge, based on
objective and reasonable perceptions, has.., a serious risk of actual bias84
impacting the due process rights of a party as enunciated in Caperton."
But the responsiveness is hardly limited to directly incorporating the case
in the rule; it includes the more significant step of full-court review, stating:
In the Supreme Court, if a justice's participation in a case is
challenged by a written motion or if the issue of participation is raised
by the justice himself or herself, the challenged justice shall decide the
CAMPAIGN FIN. NETWORK, Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.mcfn.org/press.php?prld=77.
80.
See MICH. CT. R. 2.003(C)(1)(b) (2010).

81.

AMD File No. 2009-04, Amendment of Rule 2.003 of the Michigan Court

Rules (Nov. 25, 2009), availableat http://www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Reso
urces/Administrative/2009-04-112509.pdf.
82.
See W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (1993); see also
SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 17 (describing the near ubiquity of this

provision and identifying Michigan as one of just three outliers that have not
formalized the rule).
MICH. CT. R. 2.003(C).
83.
84.

Id.; see also Amendment of Rule 2.003, supra note 81.
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issue and publish his or her reasons about whether to participate.
If the challenged justice denies the motion for disqualification, a
party may move the motion to be decided by the entire Court. The
entire Court shall then decide the motion for disqualification de novo.
The Court's decision shall include the reasons for its grant or denial of
the motion for disqualification. The Court shall issue a written order
containing a statement of reasons for its grant or denial of the motion
for disqualification. Any concurring or dissenting statements shall be
in writing. 85

Referencing the Caperton facts while on a Detroit talk radio program,
Chief Justice Kelly stated that "[w]e don't want a situation like that in
Michigan ...

. The constitutional rights of judges don't overbalance the

right of the people to get a fair trial. ' 86 Justice Michael Cavanaugh's
written concurrence supporting the adoption of the new rule asserts, as
remains true in many states around the country, that tradition rather than
wisdom was the primary argument against the new rule. According to
Justice Cavanaugh, there "is no reasonable justification that can be
proffered for allowing a justice accused of bias to be the only one who
decides whether he or she should be disqualified, other than 'we have
always done it this way.' ' 87 Chief Justice Kelly's written statement in
support of the rule goes straight to the heart of the dilemma illustrated by
Justice Benjamin, and ignored by the dissenters in Caperton: "[W]ith this
rule, the Court permits a justice's recusal where that justice is unable to
render an unbiased decision and unable or unwilling to acknowledge that
fact. The justice system and this Court can only be stronger for it.",,,
The three justices who opposed the adoption of the new rule in
Michigan assert that the rules pose, in the words of Michigan Justice Maura

85.
86.

Amendment of Rule 2.003, supra note 81, at 3-4.
Mark Hornbeck, Mich. Supreme Court Split on Judicial Disqualification,

DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 30, 2009, at 4A.

Id.
87.
Id. (emphasis added). Chief Justice Kelly's acknowledgment that
88.
sometimes judges are "unable or unwilling" to step aside, or to serve as an impartial
arbiter as to their own disqualification, is a hard truth borne out by high-profile

scenarios such as Justice Benjamin's, but also in less notorious circumstances.

As

Professor Jeffrey Stempel writes, while "[i]n close cases, judges should err on the side

of recusal in order to enhance public confidence in the judiciary," the reality is that
"unfortunately, some judges appear capable of denying even a compelling case for

disqualification." Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William's Ghost:
Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BuFF. L. REv. 813, 815 (2009).
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Corrigan, "a huge threat to our liberties as Americans." 89 Under the
dissenters' theory, "gamesmanship" 90 would rule the day, and the court
majority would not only be theoretically able, but also inclined, to impose
its will on a disfavored justice without regard for the merits of the
circumstances. For what little the political scorecard may be worth given
the polarizing nature of both the issue and the comments by the judges, the
Republican Party backed all three dissenting justices. The Democratic
Party nominated Chief Justice Kelly and Justices Cavanaugh and
Justice Elizabeth Weaver, a
Hathaway, who supported the rule.
Republican, who is seen as a moderate swing vote on the court, supported
the rule, writing that it "is a positive, historical step forward toward
achieving more transparency and fairness in the Michigan Supreme
Court." 91

Against the dissenters' hypothesis, Larry Dubin, a legal ethics
professor at the University of Detroit Mercy, asserts that the new rules
"hold the judges to a higher standard" and that while "some justices are
afraid others on the court will use this rule to disqualify them from deciding
important cases," that concern is "outweighed by the need for specific
rules." 9 Dubin is in good company. In the words of Deborah Rhode, the
director of the Center for Ethics at Stanford Law School, "[t]here's a lot
not to like in leaving it up to the conscience of the individual judge." 93
Former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White wrote an excellent
article on Caperton, published in the Harvard Law Review. Written from

her unique perspective as both a scholar and a state court jurist, the article
suggests that, when faced with a recusal motion, the "challenged judge may
grant the motion," but that "[ijf the judge does not, he or she should be
required to transfer the motion to an assigned judge or recusal panel for
decision." 94
Hornbeck, supra note 86.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Massey-Maynard Photos Highlight Judicial Recusal Rule, HUNTINGTON
HERALD-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2008, http://www.herald-dispatch.com/homepage/x808411
314; see also Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The Best Defense:
Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 530 (2007)
(asserting that "[a]llowing judges to decide on their own recusal motions is in tension
not only with the guarantee of a neutral decisionmaker, but also with our explicit
commitment to objectivity in [the recusal] arena.").
94.
Penny J. White, Relinquished Responsibilities,123 HARV. L. REv. 120, 148
(2009) (citations omitted).
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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The as-yet unapproved draft of the American Bar Association's
Judicial Disqualification Project-an effort ably directed by Indiana
Professor Charlie Geyh-frames the broader aspects of this problem and
the merits of solutions akin to Michigan's new rule:
Vesting responsibility for deciding disqualification motions in the
target judge alone is ill-advised for reasons too obvious to ignore. The
overriding point is not that a judge whose disqualification is sought is
presumptively biased against the movant, but that in a system devoted
to impartial justice both in appearance and in fact, litigants are entitled
to a process that is above suspicion.
Divesting the target judge of all authority to act when
disqualification motions are filed avoids this problem. The third
option-authorizing the target judge to review the timeliness and facial
validity of a disqualification motion before turning those that pass this
threshold scrutiny over to a second judge for a ruling on the merits of
the motion-obviates the need for a second judge to waste time on
patently defective motions and may stake out an acceptable middle
ground, provided that the target judge's discretion to deny the motions
is circumscribed. 95
"The fact that judges in many jurisdictions decide on their own
recusal challenges, with little to no prospect of immediate review, is one of
the most heavily criticized features of United States disqualification lawand for good reason." 96 Objectifying the subjective enforcement of recusal
is a sensitive subject. As Professor Geyh explained in recent Congressional
hearings:
[Jiudges who are deeply committed to the appearance and reality of
impartial justice are called upon to acknowledge, in the context of
specific cases, that despite their best efforts to preserve their
impartiality, they are either partial or appear to be so. That is a hard
thing to ask of our judges.9"
95.

See ABA

HOUSE

OF DELEGATES

STANDING COMM. ON JUD. INDEPENDENCE, REPORT TO THE

9 (2009), availableat http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?

Section=ContentFolders&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=8
5087.
96.
See SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 1; see also Amanda Frost,
Keeping up Appearances: A Process-OrientedApproach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U.

L. REv. 531, 571-72 (2005) ("Although precedent does exist for referral of
disqualification motions to a neutral judge, it is rare.") (citations omitted).
KAN.

97.

Examining the State of Judicial Recusals After Caperton v. A.T. Massey:
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Given those sensitivities, and given the extraordinary individual and
collective disincentives for court members to act in the manner that the
doomsaying dissenters predict, Michigan's new rule will likely be invoked
only in very rare instances, and will even more rarely lead to a
disqualification. Yet while Michigan's rule will only rarely be invoked, it
genuinely takes the Caperton constitutional baton and furthers the reality
and appearance of impartial justice. In that sense, and in stark contrast to
the parade-of-horribles, slippery-slope, and unworkability arguments
advanced by Chief Justice Roberts in his Caperton dissent, Michigan's new
rule represents the very best of federalism. 98 For that matter, the two
perspectives may ultimately end up proving not to be in tension with each
other. Chief Justice Roberts, of course, was objecting to the rule as
constitutionally based and unworkable, but if courts succeed in crafting
rules and processes that simply reflect good policy, the constitutional
inquiries that concern Chief Justice Roberts will generally be obviated.
C. West Virginia
Professor Geyh is correct that recusal can be a sensitive subject
among judges, and nowhere is that more true than in West Virginia. A full
recitation of the judicial circus that preceded the Caperton decision is
beyond the scope of this Article. Contextually, though, it bears noting
briefly here that in addition to the extreme nature of its best known facts,
the case also involved: (1) the recusals of two other justices; (2) front-page
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition of the H. Comm. On the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Charles G. Geyh, John F. Kimberling
Chair in Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law at Bloomington), availableat
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings
/pdf/Geyh091210.pdf.
Notably, the rule does not pretend to answer all forty of Chief Justice
98.
Roberts's questions in his Caperton dissent. Instead, the process-based approach
demonstrates that answering them immediately was always unnecessary in the first
place, and that the broad, boundary-defining value of Caperton, about which Rick
Pildes has written, is in fact deeply significant. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
129 S. Ct. 2252, 2269-72 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (listing forty numbered
questions that he characterizes as "only a few uncertainties that quickly come to
mind"); Posting of Rick Pildes to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/cap
erton-and-supreme-courts-boundary.html (June 8, 2009, 12:05); see also Posting of
kswisher to Judicial Ethics Forum, http://judicialethicsforum.com/2009/06/15/capertonanswers-to-chief-justice-roberts-twenty-questions-times-two/ (June 15, 2009, 08:50)
(noting that "an umpire who merely calls balls and strikes should be less concerned
with questions not before the court, and indeed, every case could spawn a multitude of
forward-looking questions not raised by the facts at hand").
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photographs of West Virginia's then-Chief Justice on vacation in the
Riviera with Justice Benjamin's chief benefactor, Massey Chief Executive
Officer Don Blankenship; 99 (3) a series of intracourt recriminations related
to the same; 1°° (4) an embattled court information officer's factually
selective press release and Massey's counsel's related strategic overreach; 0 1
99.
Then-West Virginia Chief Justice Eliot Maynard, who had joined the
majority's first opinion in favor of Massey, was photographed vacationing with
Blankenship on the French Riviera during the pendency of Massey's appeal. See Paul
J. Nyden, Coal Operator Says Photos Show Maynard Should Not Hear Appeal,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 2008, at 1A. After public outcry, Maynard ultimately
recused himself from the rehearing of the appeal. Justice Larry Starcher, who had
dissented from the initial opinion in favor of Massey, also recused himself from the
rehearing due to the perception created by his public statements criticizing
Blankenship and his extraordinary spending in support of Justice Benjamin. See
Voluntary Disqualification of Justice Larry V. Starcher, A.T. Massey Coal Co. v.
Caperton, 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 33350), available at http://www.state.wv.
us/wvsca/press/caperton.pdf.
100.
For example, Justice Starcher's written order in which he stepped down
from the case stated that "the pernicious effects of Mr. Blankenship's bestowal of his
personal wealth and friendship have created a cancer in the affairs of this court. And I
have seen that cancer grow and grow, in ways that I may not fully disclose at this time."
Justice Starcher Recusal Memorandum at 9, Caperton,679 S.E.2d 223.
101.
Two days after oral argument in the Supreme Court, Massey's counsel
submitted a motion for leave to file a supplemental brief on the ground that
"[a]ccording to a March 2, 2009 news release issued by the [West Virginia] Supreme
Court of Appeals' Public Information Office . . . Justice Benjamin has voted against
Massey affiliates 81.6% of the time since taking office." Supp. Brief for Respondents
at 1, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2252 (No. 08-22) (citing Press Release, Supreme Court of
Appeals State of West Virginia, Summary of Chief Justice Benjamin's Dispositive
Voting Record Regarding Massey Energy Cases from 01/01/2005 to 12/31/2008 (Mar. 2,
2009), available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/press/march2_09.htm). The West
Virginia Public Information Office failed to mention in the release that, for example,
many of those votes were five to zero procedural matters. Petitioners pointed out, in
their opposition to the supplemental filing, that the "only thing that is remotely 'new'
about the information proffered by Massey is that it was repackaged in a self-serving
news release on the eve of the oral argument before this Court." Opposition to
Respondents' Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief at 1, Caperton, 129 S. Ct.
2252 (No. 08-22). Likewise, Petitioners noted that neither the release nor the
Respondents acknowledged that:
[Alfter he denied petitioners' first motion for recusal, Justice Benjamin voted
against Massey in several other cases, in each of which his vote was not
outcome-determinative. Yet neither Massey nor the "news release" it proffers
refutes that, in the only cases in which his vote was outcome-determinative-among them, petitioners' $50 million case in which "conduct of Massey CEO
Don Blankenship was at issue"-Justice Benjamin voted for Massey.
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and (5) in a matter technically involving another case, but involving many
of the same parties, even the remarkable specter of a failed certiorari
petition, on due process grounds, focusing on the participation of another
justice, that was filed by the same lawyers who then represented Massey in
the Supreme Court and who argued that Benjamin's failure to recuse was
not even remotely a due process issue. 102
In light of the above, it was hardly surprising that recusal was not a
focal point when West Virginia's Independent Commission on Judicial
Reform, established by Governor Joe Manchin approximately one month
after the Caperton oral argument, came back with its final report. 10 3 The
Commission, for which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor served as Honorary
Chair, issued four primary recommendations. 104 Most pertinently, the
Commission suggested that the state should establish a pilot public
financing program for one of two open supreme court seats in the 2012
In connection with that recommendation, the Commission
election.'
recommended a state voter guide for judicial candidates, the intent of
which would be to serve as a source of nonpartisan information about the
candidates to supplement the current primary source-television
advertising. 10 6 The other three recommendations focused on state-specific
matters with little to no connection to the issue of money and the courts. 107
Id. at 2 (citation omitted).

102.
Massey filed a petition for certiorari arguing for the recusal of another
West Virginia Supreme Court justice on the ground that a "biased decisionmaker is
'constitutionally unacceptable."' Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Massey Energy
Co. v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 129 S. Ct. 626 (2008) (No. 08-218). Andrew L.
Frey served as counsel of record for Massey on that certiorari petition and in the

Supreme Court in Caperton. In another ironic nuance, one of the arguments Massey
advanced in that effort was that West Virginia's recusal practices violate federal due
process because they do not provide a means for the full court to review a justice's
decision not to recuse himself. See Massey Energy Co. v. Supreme Court of Appeals of
W. Va., No. 2:06-0614, 2007 WL 2778239, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 8, 2006).
103.

See W.

VA. INDEP. COMM'N ON JUD. REFORM, FINAL REPORT

(Nov. 15,

2009) (on file with Drake Law Review).
104.
See id. at 7-8.
105.
Id. at 15 ("The Legislature should adopt a public financing program
similar to that contained in the proposed Senate Bill 311 from the 2009 regular

session.").
106.

Id. at 17-19 ("The Commission also recommends the creation and

publication of a voter guide for the 2012 judicial elections.").

The other recommendations involved formalizing the process and criteria
107.
that the governor uses to select candidates to fill seats that become vacant during a
judicial term, establishing an intermediate appellate court, and undertaking a study to
determine the feasibility of a specialized business court in the state. See id. at 20-28,
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The Commission's recommendations were rather modest, despite calls
from Justice O'Connor and others for the state to move to a system of
merit-based judicial appointments. 10 8 Considered, however, in light of the
lengthy and still raw experience with Justice Benjamin-who is now the
state's Chief Justice-the Commission's report includes some remarkably
sobering reflections with respect to money and the courts. In addition to
acknowledging "an erosion of the public's confidence in the State's justice
system as a neutral and unbiased arbiter," 10 9 the Commission stated:
As campaign spending has increased, so too has the perception that
interested third parties can sway the court system in their favor
This
through monetary participation in the election process.
perception strikes at the very heart of the judiciary's role in our
society.

Something must be done to address the continued growth in
spending on judicial campaigns in West Virginia. As spending by
candidates and third parties increases, so too will the perception that
"justice may be bought." 110
As compared to the recusal and public-funding developments in
Wisconsin and Michigan,"' the nonbinding recommendations of West
Virginia's Independent Commission were quite modest. Considering the
in-state backstory, however, the modest recommendations in West Virginia
offered cause for cautious optimism that Caperton spurred not only
concern, but the potential for genuine reform. In late March of this year,
that potential was realized when, following on the recommendations of the
Commission, the West Virginia legislature passed, and Governor Manchin
system for state supreme court
signed into law, a pilot public financing
112
contests beginning in the 2012 elections.
29-45.
108.
See Chris Dickerson, JudicialReform Panel Submits Report, W. VA. REC.,
Nov. 16, 2009, http://www.wvrecord.com/news/222248-judicial-reform-panel-submits-

report.
109.
W. VA. INDEP. COMM'N ON JUD. REFORM, supra note 103, at 3.
Id. at 3-4, 12.
110.
See supra Parts I.A, I.B.
111.
See Press Release, Justice at Stake, New West Va. Law Shows "National
112.
Momentum" for Court-Election Reforms (March 25, 2010), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press-releases.cfm/new-west-va-law-shows_n
ationalmomentum for courtelectionreforms?show=news&newslD=7148.
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D. Nascent Developments in Other States
Since Caperton, commentators and advocates who favor appointive
systems, including many jurists around the country, have seized on the
case's underlying scenario as a messaging opportunity and an illustration of
the worst manifestations of judicial elections.113 While the Caperton
scenario certainly qualifies as the latter, history suggests that-messaging
opportunity or not-these advocates are unlikely to achieve their ultimate
goal of abandoning elections. Penny White recently explained that
"[d]espite clear documentation that judicial elections erode public trust and
confidence in the judiciary, we persistently avoid a discussion about the
constitutionality of judicial elections and view such a discussion as
counterproductive because surveys suggest that most Americans want to
elect their judges." 114

113.
In addition to the initiatives enumerated in this Article, a variety of
disqualification proposals were recently in various stages of circulation and adoption.
For example, in California-where many judges, though not the appellate justices, are
elected-a
commission
has
recommended
adopting
contribution-based

disqualifications over particular threshold limits.

See COMM'N FOR IMPARTIAL
COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., RECOMMENDATION FOR SAFEGUARDING
JUDICIAL QUALITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CALIFORNIA 32-34
(Aug. 2009) (draft), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jc/tflists/documents/cic-fin
alreport.pdf. In Nevada, the state supreme court declined to adopt a commission's
recommendation that judicial disqualification be triggered when a party appearing
before a judge had contributed a total of $50,000 to the judge's campaigns in the
previous six years. See Nevada High Court Revises JudicialConduct Rules, LAHONTAN
VALLEY NEWS (Fallon), Jan. 2, 2009, http://www.lahontanvalleynews.com/article/20100
102/NEWS/100109997/1002&parentprofile=1045; see also Nathan Koppel, States Weigh
Judicial Recusals: Some Judges, Businesses Oppose Restrictions on Cases Involving
Campaign Contributions,WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100
01424052748703822404575019370305029334.html (noting, in particular, the view of
Professor Jeffrey Stempel, who served on the commission, that Nevada "'missed an
opportunity to strike a blow for judicial impartiality"'). Prospectively, the Brennan
Center for Justice is tracking and periodically updating state proposals and
developments relating to recusal, which are inevitably-though one hopes not
eternally-in various inchoate stages in states around the country. See BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST., RECUSAL REFORM IN THE

STATES:

2009

TRENDS

AND

INITIATIVES,

http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/2009DISQUALIFICATIONREFORMINSTAT
ES.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
114.
White, supra note 94, at 127. While the author is relatively agnostic on
the "elections or appointments" debate, I do count myself among those who find that
the discussion is often counterproductive-particularly when the change is politically
infeasible, but the discussion persists nonetheless-and thus comes at the expense of
attention devoted to more incremental measures that might improve the perception
and actuality of fairness in the courts. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial
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Numerous judicial leaders, including, in particular, the Chief Justices
of Texas and Ohio, see Caperton as creating a window for momentum on
merit selection efforts. In November of 2009, Ohio Chief Justice Tom
Moyer convened a major conference of state and national political,
business, and civic leaders focused on Moyer's view that "[t]he time has
come to do something to address the widespread perception that campaign
contributions influence judicial decision making. Our goal is to determine
whether to pursue a new selection method for Supreme Court Justices.' 1 15
Chief Justice Moyer, having been elected four times, was at the time the
longest-sitting state Chief Justice in the country, and he was quite familiar
with expensive state supreme court contests-between 2000 and 2008, Ohio
ranked first in the nation for the $20 million spent on television
advertisements in supreme court races.116 At the close of the conference,
Moyer pledged in a press release to work with state organizations "to
support a constitutional amendment to replace statewide elections of the
justices with a new system where justices are appointed and stand for a
'
retention election."117
The mountain is tall. Ohio's voters roundly rejected
a similar proposal in 1987.118
Chief Justice Moyer's words echoed those of Texas Chief Justice
Wallace Jefferson, who referenced Caperton in a February, 2009 (predecision) address to the Texas state legislature, in which he argued that:

Selection Debate and Why it Matters for Judicial Independence, 21

GEO. J. LEGAL

ETHICS 1259, 1279-80 (2008) (noting that changing election systems "can be a worthy
goal and one well worth pursuing ... but not at the expense of ignoring shorter-term
remedies that can make a bad system better in the interim").
115.
Patrick Lewis, Editorial, False Perception of Elected Judges, AKRON
BEACON J., Nov. 24, 2009, http://www.ohio.com/editorial/commentary/72246132.html.

Information on the conference is available on its website at http://www.judicialselection
.net/Test.asp.
116.

SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 12. Chief Justice Moyer passed away on April

2, 2010. Chief Justice Moyer's passing is not only a great loss to the state of Ohio, but
to citizens around the country who, regardless of political persuasion, cherish the rule
of law and the judiciary's role in its preservation.
117.
William Hershey, Chief Justice Moyer, Allies Promise Campaign to
Change Selection of Supreme Court Justices, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 20, 2009,
http://www.daytondailynews.com o/content/shared-gen/blogs/dayton/ohiopolitics/entrie
s/2009/11/20/chief-justice-moyer-allies-pro.html.
118.
James Nash, Democratic Judge Against Merit Picks for High Court,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.dispatchpolitics.com/live/content/local
-news/stories/2009/12/01/copy/dem-judge-against-high-court-merit-picks.html?adsec=p
olitics&sid=101.
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If the public believes that judges are biased toward contributors, then
confidence in the courts will suffer. So I ask the question-is our
current judicial election system, which fuels the idea that politics and
money play into the rule of law, the best way to elect judges in Texas?
The status quo is broken.) 9

After the decision, Chief Justice Jefferson asserted in a statement that
the "'Capertondecision challenges us to do more to remove the perception
that judicial campaign contributions influence decisions in Texas courts.
Caperton identified a core problem that exists in Texas ... ,",120 Chief
Justice Jefferson's view is shared by, among others, one of his predecessors
as Texas Chief Justice, Tom Phillips, who "'hope[s Caperton] will spur

states to focus on whether our 19th century method of selecting judges
works well in the 21st century."" 121
The political landscape with respect to changing judicial selection in
Texas and Ohio is largely mirrored in other traditional judicial election

battlegrounds, including Pennsylvania, where the House Judiciary
Committee recently held hearings aimed at promoting a commission-based
appointment system. 122
The concept of an appointive system in
Pennsylvania received some conditional support for the first time from the
AFL-CIO, 123 as well as renewed support from Governor Ed Rendell and
others. 124 Similarly, in Michigan, the first steps in what some envision as a
119.
Wallace B. Jefferson, Chief Justice, Sup. Ct. of Tex., Address to the 81st
Legislature 9 (Feb. 11, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.setexasrecord.com/cont
ent/img/f217336/2009stateofthejudiciary.pdf).
120.
Mary Flood, High Court Ruling May Stir Debate in Texas, HOUSTON
CHRON., June 8,2009, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/6465965.html.
121.
Eliza Newlin Carney, A Win for FairerCourts, NAT'L J., June 15, 2009,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/rg-20090615_7680.php.
122.
The Appellate Court Nominating Commission: Hearing on H.R. 1619
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,2009 Leg., 194th Sess. (Pa. 2009).
123.
Holly Herman, Pennsylvanians Likely to Continue Electing, Not
Appointing Judges, Local Legal Community Says, READING EAGLE, Dec. 25, 2009,
http://readingeagle.com/article.aspx?id=180475 (explaining that the AFL-CIO prefers
electing judges but is willing to consider merit selection because voter turnout is low).
124.
Choose Judges on Merit, Supporters of Merit Selection in Pennsylvania,
June 17, 2008, http://judgesonmerit.org/about-this-campaign/supporters-of-meritselection/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2010). Pennsylvania, which has been rocked with
expensive races for its high court in recent years, including the most expensive contest
in the nation during the 2007-08 election cycle, is another state in which charges of
"pay to play" justice have been leveled. Current Justice Joan Orie Melvin, addressing
the matter of her opponent's seven-figure support from a state political action
committee, said "such a large donation made it look like 'justice for sale' and 'pay to
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ten-year plan to bring about a commission-based appointment system were
taken in February, 2010, when state leaders convened a conference similar
to the one in Ohio, with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivering the
keynote address. 125

In 2004, Seth Andersen, the Executive Director of the American
Judicature Society, wrote that "[p]opular support for constitutional change
from judicial elections to merit selection systems has declined significantly
over the past three decades." 126 The first test for whether there might be
any groundswell of populist support for moving away from elected
judiciaries will come this year in Nevada, where in 2007 and 2008 the state
legislature, responding in part to contribution-related scandals at the state
trial court level,127 approved a proposed constitutional amendment in which
candidates would first go through a commission-based appointment
process and then would face a retention election in which they "would
need 55% of the vote to remain in office."'1 28 Nevada "voters rejected
appointment systems in 1972 and 1988."129

There is little question that efforts favoring appointment systems
around the country have been rejuvenated since Caperton. Apart from
Nevada, where the answer as to whether voters favor moving to an
appointment system will come this year, the answer to the question of
whether the more inchoate appointment efforts will bear fruit is a matter
about which this author is dubious. Still, the United States Supreme
play."' Tom Barnes, Orie Melvin Bucks Odds to Win Pa. Supreme Court Seat,
PIrSBURGH PosT-GAZETrE, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09308/1010
658-178.stm.
Wayne State University Event Calendar, Options for an Independent
125.
Judiciary in Michigan featuring Sandra Day O'Connor, http://events.wayne.edu/law/20
10/02/09/options-for-an-independent-judiciary-in-michigan-featuring-sandra-day-o-con
nor-21332/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
Seth Andersen, Examining the Decline in Support for Merit Selection in
126.
the States, 67 ALB. L. REV. 793, 793 (2004).
See Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, In Las Vegas, They're
127.
Playing with a Stacked JudicialDeck, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2006, http://articles.latimes.co
m/2006/jun/08/nation/na-vegas8 (finding that even Nevada judges running unopposed,
but who benefited from a ready campaign warchest, collected hundreds of thousands of
campaign dollars from litigants and lawyers, and finding, most notably, that the
donations were frequently via checks dated "within days of when a judge took action in
the contributor's case").
See Am. Judicature Soc., Judicial Selection in the States: Nevada,
128.
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/index.cfm?state=NV (last visited Apr.
19, 2010).
See id.
129.
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Court's imprimatur in support of the proposition that there are serious
risks inherent in injecting large amounts of money into the judicial process
can only serve to help those efforts on the margins.
III. CONCLUSION
In his ever-trenchant manner, Roy Schotland recently wrote:
"Caperton's fundamental holding is that judicial elections are different.
One cannot conceive of a court holding that a legislator (or executive)
would be barred from acting in X matter because a campaign supporter
was involved."' 13 0 Caperton established, in Schotland's terms, the absolute
minimum level of "difference" that is constitutionally required. 131 Still,
Wisconsin's new recusal rule reflects the inertia and opposition among
some to recognizing that in the context of the judiciary-regardless of
whether judges are appointed or elected--due process, as well at the First
Amendment, must be protected. The groundbreaking recusal rule adopted
by the Michigan Supreme Court, however, as well as the public financing
system signed into law in Wisconsin, have the potential to mitigate the
appearance of money influencing the judiciary in the courts of those states.
The initial recommendations of West Virginia's Independent Commission
on Judicial Reform, including the pilot program for public financing of its
high court campaigns, are quite modest, but plainly reflect a chastened
view and a renewed commitment to reverse what it bluntly described as the
"erosion of the public's confidence in the State's justice system as a neutral
and unbiased arbiter."132 Finally, Caperton is rejuvenating efforts in some
states to at least reconsider whether, given the spiraling costs of judicial
elections and the commensurate conflicts created by expensive campaigns,
carefully crafted appointive systems might better serve the public. In sum,
following Caperton, states are taking next steps to protect the differences
that make the judiciary distinct, and the early returns reflect cautious and
mixed, but mostly positive, results.

130.
131.
132.

Schotland, supra note 4, at 344.

Id.
W. VA. INDEP. COMM'N ON JUD. REFORM, supra note 103, at 3.

